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1. Introduction
Various independence results in bounded arithmetic have been obtained using
forcing type arguments. We describe a frame for forcing that can be seen as a
common generalization of these arguments and Cohen forcing in set theory.
We do not assume familiarity with bounded arithmetic nor with forcing. This
introduction informally gives some general motivation, describes the connection
to propositional proof complexity, reviews the mentioned forcing type arguments,
compares them with Cohen forcing and then describes in some more detail the
contents of this paper. More precise information can be found following the
references, mainly pointing to surveys. All results are stated and proved in a
generally accessible language. Some of their links to bounded arithmetic and
propositional proof complexity are made explicit by remarks intended for the
informed reader.
1.1. Foundational questions and complexity. Basic questions concerning
the foundations of mathematics quickly lead to fundamental open problems from
computational complexity theory like P vs. NP or NP vs. coNP. Indeed, Kraj´ıcˇek
argues that these questions can be understood as “quantitative versions” [24,
Section 5] of the central questions of mathematical logic a century ago, namely
for the consistency and the decidability of first-order theories. Also Kraj´ıcˇek and
Pudla´k [26] tie the viability of versions of Hilbert’s program to the nondetermin-
istic time complexity of coNP.
Pudla´k argues that our understanding of independence is unsatisfactory in that
“except for Go¨del’s theorem which gives only special formulas, no general method
is known to prove independence of [arithmetical] Π1 sentences” [31, Section 3].
Here progress is braked by the fact that already weak arithmetical theories like
those in Buss’ hierarchy correspond in a certain precise sense to the complexity
classes in the polynomial hierarchy. [21, 10] are monographs, [9, 8] surveys on
the subject.
Furthermore, establishing independence from bounded arithmetics is roughly
equivalent to establishing proof-size lower bounds for propositional logic:
1.2. Proof complexity. For a sufficiently general notion of propositional proof
system, the conjecture NP 6= coNP means that no propositional proof system
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has short proofs of all tautologies (i.e. of size polynomial in the length of the
tautology) [11]. But today this is open even for the usual textbook systems,
called Frege systems: Hilbert style calculi given by finitely many inference rules.
[34, 32, 44, 4, 37] survey known lower bounds for weaker systems with partly
different emphases.
Now, arithmetical theories are simulated by (often natural) propositional proof
systems in the sense that theorems of the theory translate to sequences of tau-
tologies with short proofs in the system (see [26] for a general treatment, [7] for
a recent survey).
Example 1.1 (Paris-Wilkie translation). The theory I∆0(R) is Peano arithmetic
where the induction scheme is adopted only for bounded formulas but in the
language augmented by some new, say, binary relation symbol R. If I∆0(R)
proves a ∆0-formula ϕ(R, x), then ∀R∀xϕ(R, x) is true (in the standard model).
This translates to a sequence of tautologies 〈ϕ(R, x)〉m,m ∈ N : insert m for x
in ϕ(R, x), replace bounded quantifiers by conjunctions or disjunctions, replace
atoms not mentioning R by their truth values and keep atoms of the form Rk`
as propositional variables.
Paris and Wilkie [29] construct from a proof of ϕ(R, x) in I∆0(R) and m ∈ N a
short (length mO(1)) proof of 〈ϕ(R, x)〉m in a bounded depth Frege system. This is
a Frege system where only formulas of at most some fixed ∧/∨-alternation rank
are allowed. y
This way, independence can be inferred from proof-size lower bounds. A weak
converse holds too. It is based on a type of argument invented by Ajtai [1], and
it is here where forcing comes in.
1.3. Forcing in bounded arithmetic. Cohen’s method of forcing cannot be
used to prove independence of arithmetical statements because Vω is not changed
in generic extensions. In an informal sense however, forcing has been used to
prove independence from weak arithmetics.
Paris and Wilkie used “a simple forcing argument” [29, p.333] to show that the
least number principle for existential formulas mentioning R does not suffice to
prove the (bijective) pigeonhole principle PHP(R, x): “R is not a bijection from
{y | y ≤ x} onto {y | y < x}”.
Riis [35] “proved by forcing” [35, p.1] that even the least number principle for
formulas with a certain amount of universal quantification does not suffice (Buss’
theory T 12 (R)). Furthermore, Riis generalized this to other principles.
Ajtai [1] proved that I∆0(R) does not prove PHP(R, x). In fact, he proved
that the tautologies 〈PHP(R, x)〉n, n ≥ 1, do not have short proofs in bounded
depth Frege systems. [30, 27] improved this to an exponential proof-size lower
bound, implying independence from Buss’ T2(R).
1.4. Ajtai’s argument. Ajtai constructs a certain expansion (M,R) of a non-
standard model M of true arithmetic where PHP(R, n) fails for some nonstandard
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n ∈M . Assume M contains a size n100 depth 17 Frege proof pi of 〈PHP(R, x)〉n.
But this formula is ‘false’ in (M,R) under the assignment corresponding to R.
The art is to construct R in such a way that (M,R) satisfies the least number
principle up to n100 for the property of being a ‘false’ line in pi. Then pi contains
a first ‘false’ line. One argues that this contradicts the soundness of the system
and concludes that pi cannot exist.
The construction of R is “done according to the general ideas of Cohen’s
method of forcing ” [1, p.348]. However, the argument is “mostly combinato-
rial and probabilistic” [1, p.347] relying on a complicated version of Hastad’s
switching lemma [15]. As Ben-Sasson and Harsha put it, it is “extremely difficult
to understand and explain” [6, section 1].
Lots of efforts have been made to simplify and reinterpret Ajtai’s argument e.g.
as a construction of valuations in Boolean algebras [32] or partial Boolean algebras
[21, 22] or recently in terms of Buss-Pudla´k games [6, 33]. In [23] Kraj´ıcˇek
gives some general account, motivated “to understand the combinatorics behind
constructions” [23, p.437] like Ajtai’s. Conceptually, later improvements [5, 30,
27, 45] of Ajtai’s result “eliminate the non-standard model theory” [5, p.367] and
the forcing mode of speech. And technically, the mentioned switching lemmas
have been improved and simplified (see [3, 43] for surveys).
Despite these efforts, not much is known on how to apply Ajtai’s argument
to stronger systems or other principles (cf. [21, Chapter 12] for known results).
Perhaps one can say the abovementioned efforts did not lead to an understanding
of Ajtai’s argument as instantiating some general method as Pudla´k asks for –
but see Section 1.7 for recent progress.
1.5. Comparison with Cohen forcing. This sorry state of affairs clearly con-
trasts with Cohen forcing in set theory. We recall briefly and informally its set-up.
With a model M of ZF and a ‘generic’ set G external to M one associates a model
M [G] containing G. Intuitively, G being ‘generic’ means being ‘random’ with
respect to possible partial information about it. Forcing is a way to reason about
M [G] using partial information about G. A piece of partial information p forces
ϕ if any generic G ‘satisfying’ p leads to a model M [G] satisfying ϕ. Such pieces
can be extended in various, possibly incompatible ways, so we think of them as
being partially ordered (the forcing frame).
The Extension Lemma states that extension preserves forcing. Reasoning
about forcing rests on this and, following Shoenfield [38], two more central lem-
mas: the Truth Lemma asserts that every sentence true in M [G] is already forced
by some partial information p about G; the Definability Lemma states that forc-
ing, as a binary relation, is definable in M . In turn, these forcing lemmas rest on
the Forcing Completeness Theorem, a characterization of the ‘semantic’ forcing
notion above by a handier ‘syntactic’ notion that is defined via recursion on logi-
cal syntax. This understanding of forcing underlies the “Principal Theorem” [38]
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stating that M [G] models ZF. This way an independence question is reduced to
a combinatorial task of designing an appropriate forcing frame.
In contrast, the mentioned forcing type arguments [29, 35, 1] in bounded arith-
metic are not based on some more general background theory of forcing. Ajtai
writes “Our terminology will be similar to the terminology of forcing but we
actually do not use any result from it” [1, p.348]. Insofar it is not completely
clear why one should refer to these arguments as forcing arguments. Technically,
the crucial difference is that the Definability Lemma fails. Forcing Completeness
is proved neither in the original arguments nor in later presentations [46], [21,
Section 12.7] that emphasize the forcing mode of speech. In [29, 1] no ‘syntactic’
notion is defined, in [35] it is, but one for which Forcing Completeness fails.
1.6. This work. We propose a general background theory of forcing as a unifying
way to understand the arguments of Paris, Wilkie, Riis and Ajtai [29, 35, 1].
In paragraph 2 we develop forcing generally as a method to construct generic
“associates” that may happen to be extensions or expansions or neither, and
without a Definability Lemma. It is general enough to naturally accommodate
the mentioned forcing arguments [29, 35, 1] as well as Cohen forcing and many
others.
In the context of bounded arithmetics, a Principal Theorem would state that
generic expansions satisfy the least number principle for a certain fragment of
formulas. In paragraph 3 we show this holds true when using a forcing that
is in an appropriate sense ‘definable’ for the fragment in question. Thereby
again, independence questions reduce to a combinatorial task of designing forcing
frames.
In paragraph 4 we prove the independence results in [29, 35, 1] by this method.
The aim is to understand the progress as being constituted by inventing forcings
that are ‘definable’ for larger and larger fragments.
1.7. Related work. Forcing has been developed outside set theory in many
different settings. We will review some of them, but are unable to give a complete
survey (cf. [17, 2]). Forcing against bounded arithmetic has been developed by
Takeuti and Yasumoto [41, 42] following not Cohen’s original method but its
reformulation by Scott and Solovay [36] as a method to construct Boolean valued
models (see Remark 2.7). Scott [36] describes such a model for a 3rd order theory
of the reals, by interpreting the language over real valued random variables. In
his recent book [25] Kraj´ıcˇek develops such forcing with random variables in
full detail as a method to study bounded arithmetics by using algorithmically
restricted random variables. Ajtai’s result can be proved using this method.
2. Forcing in general
This paragraph develops a general frame for forcing arguments. In 2.1 we
fix notation and establish basic facts concerning ‘syntactic’ forcing relations. In
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principle, countless ‘syntactic” forcing relations  may be defined, depending on
how  interacts with the logical symbols. Throughout this paper we assume (first-
order) formulas to be written in the logical symbols {∀, ∃,∧,∨,¬} and we shall
restrict attention to two kinds of forcings only, namely, universal and existential
forcings1. Roughly, the choice depends on whether {∀,∧,¬} or {∃,∨,¬} is taken
as primitive while the other logical symbols are defined using the usual classical
dualities. Existential forcing is often used, but we shall see that it has some
disadvantages over universal forcing (Remark 2.33). In 2.2 we define a notion of
genericity that is sufficiently general for all our purposes. In 2.3 we define generic
associates and prove the Truth Lemma and the Forcing Completeness Theorem.
Section 2.4 considers an important type of forcing that we call conservative.
Section 2.5 gives examples and, finally, 2.6 discusses weak forcing.
In this paragraph we fix
– a countable forcing frame (P,≤, D0, D1, . . .) (defined below),
– a countable structure M interpreting a countable language L,
– a countable language L∗ ⊇ L.
The forcing language is L∗(M), that is L∗ together with all a ∈ M as constants
(we do not distinguish between M and its universe notationally). If not explicitly
specified otherwise we let ϕ, ψ, . . . range over L∗(M)-sentences.
2.1. Forcing relations. We recall some elementary forcing terminology. A forc-
ing frame is a structure (P,≤, D0, D1, . . .) such that ≤ partially orders P and
D0, D1, . . . are subsets of P . We use p, q, r, . . . to range over elements of P , called
conditions. If p ≤ q we say p extends q and call p an extension of q. If p, q have
a common extension, then they are compatible, symbolically p‖q; otherwise they
are incompatible, symbolically p⊥q.
A set of conditions X ⊆ P is downward-closed if it contains all extensions of its
elements; being upward-closed is similarly explained. The set X is consistent if
it contains a common extension of any two of its elements. If X is both upward-
closed and consistent, then it is a filter. Further, X is dense below p if for every
q ≤ p there is r ≤ q such that r ∈ X. Finally, X is dense if it is dense below all
conditions, or equivalently, if every condition has an extension in X.
Definition 2.1. A pre-forcing is a binary relation  between conditions and
L∗(M)-sentences. If p  ϕ, we say p forces ϕ.
We use the notation
[ϕ] := {p | p  ϕ}.
1See [16, 2] for examples of forcings that are neither universal nor existential.
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Definition 2.2. A pre-forcing  is universal or existential if it satisfies the fol-
lowing conditions of universal respectively existential forcing recurrence:
universal existential
p  ¬ϕ iff ∀q ≤ p : q 6 ϕ iff ∀q ≤ p : q 6 ϕ
p  (ϕ ∧ ψ) iff p  ϕ and p  ψ iff p  ¬(¬ϕ ∨ ¬ψ)
p  (ϕ ∨ ψ) iff p  ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) iff p  ϕ or p  ψ
p  ∀xχ(x) iff ∀a ∈M : p  χ(a) iff p  ¬∃x¬χ(x)
p  ∃xχ(x) iff p  ¬∀x¬χ(x) iff ∃a ∈M : p  χ(a).
Observe that a universal or existential pre-forcing is uniquely determined by
its restriction to the atomic sentences of the forcing language.
Solving the recurrence one sees, for universal pre-forcings, that p  ∃xχ(x) if
and only if
⋃
a∈M [χ(a)] is dense below p. For existential pre-forcings one sees
p  ∀xχ(x) if and only if [χ(a)] is dense below p for all a ∈ M . We collect some
further direct consequences:
Lemma 2.3. If  is a universal or an existential pre-forcing, then
(1) p  ¬¬ϕ if and only if [ϕ] is dense below p.
(2) (Consistency) [ϕ] ∩ [¬ϕ] = ∅.
(3) [ϕ] ∪ [¬ϕ] is dense.
Definition 2.4. Let  be a pre-forcing and Φ be a set of L∗(M)-formulas.
(a)  satisfies Extension for Φ if for every ϕ ∈ Φ, the set [ϕ] is downward-
closed.
(b)  satisfies Stability for Φ if for every ϕ ∈ Φ and p ∈ P , we have that p
forces ϕ whenever [ϕ] is dense below p.
For Φ = L∗(M) we omit the reference to it.
(c)  is a forcing if it satisfies Extension and Stability for L∗(M)-atoms.
Lemma 2.5. The following hold:
(1) (Extension) Universal and existential forcings satisfy Extension.
(2) (Stability) Universal forcings satisfy Stability.
(3) For a universal forcing  it holds that p  ϕ if and only if [ϕ] is dense
below p.
(4) For a universal forcing  it holds that p 6 ϕ if and only if q  ¬ϕ for
some q ≤ p.
Proof. Extension can be shown by a straightforward induction using forcing
recurrence. We prove Stability by induction on (the number of logical symbols)
in ϕ. Having a universal forcing we can assume that ϕ is written in the logical
base {∧,¬,∀}.
For atomic ϕ Stability is part of the definition of being a forcing.
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For the ¬-step argue indirectly: if p 6 ¬ϕ, then by forcing recurrence some
q ≤ p forces ϕ, so by Extension and Consistency no extension of q forces ¬ϕ.
Hence [¬ϕ] is not dense below p.
For the ∧-step, note [(ϕ∧ ψ)] = [ϕ]∩ [ψ] by universal recurrence. If this set is
dense below p then so are both [ϕ] and [ψ]. By induction p forces both ϕ and ψ,
and hence p  (ϕ ∧ ψ) by universal recurrence.
The ∀-step is similar.
(3) is immediate by (1) and (2), and (4) follows from (3): p 6 ϕ if and only
if [ϕ] is not dense below p if and only if there is q ≤ p such that for all r ≤ q,
r 6 ϕ, if and only if (by forcing recurrence) there is q ≤ p such that q  ¬ϕ. 
Example 2.6. Let  be a universal forcing. A pre-forcing of obvious interest is:
p‖ϕ if and only if p 6 ¬ϕ, that is, q  ϕ for some q ≤ p.
We have  ⊆ ‖ by Consistency. Stability of  implies: p‖¬¬ϕ if and only if p‖ϕ.
Further
p‖¬ϕ iff ∃q ≤ p : q 6 ‖ϕ
p‖(ϕ ∨ ψ) iff p‖ϕ or p‖ψ (as existential pre-forcing)
p‖∃xχ(x) iff ∃a ∈M : p‖χ(a) (as existential pre-forcing).
Remark 2.7 (Boolean valued models). The last lemma has a natural topological
reading. Namely, (P,≤) carries the topology whose open sets are the downward-
closed sets. A set X ⊆ P has interior X˚ = {p | ∀q ≤ p : q ∈ X} and closure X =
{p | ∃q ∈ X : q ≤ p}. For example, {p | p‖ϕ} = [ϕ]. The sets equal to the interior
of their closure are the regularly open ones. Note X˚ = {p | X is dense below p}.
Thus Extension means that the sets [ϕ] are open and Stability means that they
are even regularly open.
The regularly open sets form a complete Boolean algebra in such a way that,
for universal forcings, the map ϕ 7→ [ϕ] is a Boolean valuation of L∗(M) in this
algebra.
2.2. Genericity. Let  be an arbitrary pre-forcing. Ideally one would like to
call a set generic if it intersects every dense set. As in general such sets do not
exist, one has to restrict attention to those dense sets coming from a certain
‘sufficiently rich’ but countable Boolean algebra B().
In set theory usually the forcing frame is a set in M and one simply takes
the algebra of sets definable in M (cf. Example 2.24). As M models ZF it is
not surprising that this algebra is sufficiently rich. For some purposes (cf. Ex-
amples 2.26, 2.28, 2.29) already the algebra generated by the [ϕ]s is sufficiently
rich, but not so in forcing against bounded arithmetic. One needs the family to
contain certain sets as e.g.
⋃
a∈M [ϕ(a)] that we do construct in proofs. [29, 1, 35]
all define suitable algebras ad hoc for their respective situations and a canonical
choice does not seem to exist in general.
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It is therefore that we padded the forcing frame by the sets D0, D1, . . .: these
sets will determine the algebra B().
Definition 2.8. A set G ⊆ P is generic if it is a filter and intersects every dense
(in P ) set in B().
Our definition of B() is based on the following logic. We call it the Stern
formalism because a similar one has been used by Stern in [40].
First we define its syntax. Consider the two-sorted first-order structure (P,M)
consisting of one sort carrying the forcing frame (P,≤, D0, D1, . . .) and a second
sort carrying the structure M . Let ν, µ, ξ, . . . be individual variables ranging over
the first sort and x, y, z, . . . range over the second sort. The syntax of the Stern
formalism is given by the syntax of the two-sorted first-order language of (P,M)
plus the following syntactical rule:
if ϕ(x¯) is an L∗-formula, then (ξ ` ϕ(x¯)) is a formula of the Stern
formalism.
Note this does not allow for nested occurrences of `.
We now explain the semantics of the Stern formalism. Generally, it is inter-
preted in ‘forcing structures’ (Q,N,) given by a two-sorted first-order structure
(Q,N) as above (the first sort Q carries a forcing frame and the second sort N
an L-structure) together with  ⊆ Q× L∗(N).
The definition of the satisfaction relation is straightforward. We give it for our
‘standard’ structure (P,M,). Formulas not involving ` are evaluated as usual
in (P,M). Further we say that pa¯ satisfies (ξ ` ϕ(x¯)) in (P,M,) if and only if
p  ϕ(a¯), where pa¯ is any assignment for ξx¯, i.e. p ∈ P and a¯ is a suitable tuple
from M ; note that here ϕ(a¯) is a sentence of the forcing language L∗(M).
Definition 2.9. The forcing algebra B() is the set of all subsets of P definable
in (P,M,) by a formula ϕ(ξ) of the Stern formalism.
Here and in the following, definable (in a certain structure) always means de-
finable with parameters (from the structure). Clearly, the forcing algebra B() is
countable. Then
Lemma 2.10. Every condition is contained in some generic set.
Sketch of Proof. Given p ∈ P , choose p1 ≤ p in the first dense set, then p2 ≤ p1 in
the second dense set and so on. The filter generated by the sequence p, p1, p2, . . .
is generic. 
Lemma 2.11. If G is generic and D ∈ B() is dense below p ∈ G, then there is
q ∈ G ∩D with q ≤ p.
Proof. Let D ∈ B() be dense below p. It is routine to verify that
D(p) := (D ∩ {q | q ≤ p}) ∪ {q | p⊥q}
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is dense. Further D(p) ∈ B(): if D is defined by ϕD(ξ), then D(p) is defined by
(ϕD(ξ) ∧ ξ ≤ p) ∨ ¬∃ν(ν ≤ ξ ∧ ν ≤ p),
a formula (with parameters) of the Stern formalism. By genericity there exists
an r ∈ G ∩D(p). As p ∈ G and G is consistent, r /∈ {q | p⊥q}, so r ∈ D ∩ {q |
q ≤ p}. 
2.3. Generic associates. Let  be a universal or existential forcing.
The aim is to define for suitable G ⊆ P (and our fixed structure M) an L∗(M)-
structure M [G] in such a way, that it models the following theory in the forcing
language L∗(M):
Th(G) :=
{
ϕ ∈ L∗(M) | ∃p ∈ G : p  ϕ}.
Obviously this cannot work in general, e.g. Th(G) may contradict usual first-
order equality axioms. But we shall see that this is the only obstacle provided
we stick to the idea that the constants from M “name” all the elements of M [G].
First observe that for generic G, the theory Th(G) is complete and formally
consistent in the following sense:
Lemma 2.12. Let G be generic. For every L∗(M)-sentence ϕ either ϕ ∈ Th(G)
or ¬ϕ ∈ Th(G), but not both.
Proof. By Lemma 2.3 (3), G intersects [ϕ] ∪ [¬ϕ] ∈ B(). Hence ϕ ∈ Th(G)
or ¬ϕ ∈ Th(G) – but not both: assume there would be p ∈ G forcing ϕ and
q ∈ G forcing ¬ϕ. Since G is a filter and filters are consistent, there would exist r
extending both p and q; by Extension r would force both ϕ and ¬ϕ contradicting
Consistency (of forcing). 
To define M [G] we rely on some elementary facts about factorizations: for a
theory T in a language L containing some constant symbol, the Herbrand term
structure T(T ) for T has as universe all closed L-terms, interprets a function
symbol f ∈ L by t¯ 7→ f(t¯) and interprets a relation symbol R ∈ L by {t¯ | Rt¯ ∈ T}.
Note that in T(T ) every closed term denotes itself. A congruence ∼ on T(T ) is an
equivalence relation on T(T ) such that functions in T(T ) (i.e. interpretations of
function symbols of L) map equivalent arguments (i.e. componentwise equivalent
argument tuples) to equivalent values and every relation of T(T ) is a union of
equivalence classes of tuples. In this case, let T(T )/∼ denote the L-structure
induced by T(T ) on the ∼-classes in the natural way. In T(T )/∼ every closed
term t denotes its ∼-class t/∼.
Fact 2.13. If ∼T := {(s, t) | s = t ∈ T} is a congruence on T(T ), then the atomic
sentences true in T(T )/∼T are precisely those contained in T .
Definition 2.14. Let G ⊆ P . If ∼Th(G) is a congruence on T(Th(G)) and every
closed term of the forcing language is ∼Th(G)-congruent to a constant a ∈ M ,
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then we say M [G] is defined and set
M [G] := T(Th(G))/∼Th(G) .
If G is generic and M [G] defined, then M [G] is a generic associate of M .
We call M [G] a generic extension of M , if L = L∗ and there is an embedding
of M into M [G].
We call M [G] a generic expansion of M , if
a 7→ a/∼Th(G): M ∼= M [G]  L,
that is, if the map that sends each a ∈M to its ∼Th(G)-congruence class a/∼Th(G)
is an isomorphism of M onto the restriction of M [G] to L.
Remark 2.15. Sometimes we shall need the assumption that M [G] is defined for
every generic G. Because this assumption is trivially satisfied in all applications
we are aware of, we consider it as a mere technicality and make no efforts to
avoid it.
Lemma 2.16. Let G be generic.
(1) M [G] is defined if for all closed L∗(M)-terms t, t′, all L∗(M)-atoms ϕ(x)
and all p ∈ P
(a) if p  t = t′, then q  t′ = t for some q ≤ p,
(b) if p  ϕ(t) and p  t = t′, then q  ϕ(t′) for some q ≤ p,
(c) q  t = a for some q ≤ p and a ∈M .
(2) If M [G] is defined, then it has universe {a/∼Th(G)| a ∈M}.
We omit the proof.
Theorem 2.17 (Truth Lemma). Let G be generic. If M [G] is defined, then
Th(M [G]) = Th(G).
Proof. We have to show: M [G] |= ϕ if and only if p  ϕ for some p ∈ G. We
have two cases depending of whether  is universal or existential. In both cases
we proceed by induction on ϕ.
The case where  is existential is easy. The base case follows by construction
(Fact 2.13). Both the ∨-step and the ∃-step are trivial. Finally, ¬ϕ ∈ Th(M [G]),
i.e. ϕ /∈ Th(M [G]), is equivalent to ϕ /∈ Th(G) by induction and thus to ¬ϕ ∈
Th(G) by Lemma 2.12.
The case where  is universal is more complicated. The base case and the
¬-step follow exactly as in the existential case. The ∧-step is straightforward
using the consistency of G.
For the ∀-step, first assume that some p ∈ G forces ∀xϕ(x), i.e. p  ϕ(a)
for every a ∈ M by universal recurrence. By induction M [G] |= ϕ(a) for every
a ∈M . Hence M [G] |= ∀xϕ(x) by Lemma 2.16 (2).
Conversely, assume ∀xϕ(x) /∈ Th(G). We aim to show ϕ(a) /∈ Th(M [G]) for
some a ∈M .
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By Lemma 2.12, ¬∀xϕ(x) ∈ Th(G), i.e. some p ∈ G forces ¬∀xϕ(x). By
universal recurrence this means that for every q ≤ p there is a ∈ M such that
q 6 ϕ(a). By Lemma 2.5 (4) this means: for every q ≤ p there is a ∈ M and
there is r ≤ q such that r  ¬ϕ(a). In other words, the set
D :=
⋃
a∈M
[¬ϕ(a)]
is dense below p.
Clearly, D ∈ B(): it is defined by ∃x(ξ ` ¬ϕ(x)), a formula (with parameters)
of the Stern formalism.
As p ∈ G, G intersects D by Lemma 2.11, i.e. there is some a ∈ M such that
¬ϕ(a) ∈ Th(G). Then ϕ(a) /∈ Th(G) by Lemma 2.12, so ϕ(a) /∈ Th(M [G]) by
induction. 
Corollary 2.18. Assume M [G] is defined for every generic G. Then
(1) if  is existential, then p  ϕ implies M [G] |= ϕ for every generic G
containing p.
(2) (Forcing Completeness) if  is universal, then p  ϕ if and only if
M [G] |= ϕ for every generic G containing p.
Proof. By the Truth Lemma p  ϕ implies M [G] |= ϕ for every generic G contain-
ing p. This shows (1) and the forward direction of (2). The backward direction
of (2) relies on Lemma 2.5 (4) for universal forcings: if p 6 ϕ, there is q ≤ p such
that q  ¬ϕ. By Lemma 2.10 there is a generic G containing q. By the Truth
Lemma M [G] |= ¬ϕ, i.e. M [G] 6|= ϕ. Being a filter, G contains p. 
Corollary 2.19. Assume that M [G] is defined for every generic G and that 
is universal. Then for every condition p ∈ P the set {ϕ | p  ϕ} is closed under
logical consequence.
Proof. For every p ∈ P , the set of ϕ satisfying the right hand side of Forcing
Completeness is obviously closed under logical consequence. 
Example 2.20. Let  be a universal forcing and recall the associated pre-forcing
‖ from Example 2.6. Assume M [G] is defined for every generic G. Then
(1) p‖ϕ if and only if M [G] |= ϕ for some generic G containing p;
(2) for every condition p ∈ P , the set {ϕ | p‖ϕ} is closed under logical
consequence. y
We have the following preservation result.
Theorem 2.21. Let T be a universal L∗-theory. If both
(i) for every condition p, the theory T is consistent with
Lit(p) := {ϕ | p  ϕ, ϕ is an L∗(M)-Literal},
(ii) and for every closed L∗(M)-term t, the set
⋃
a∈M [t = a] is dense,
then M [G] is defined for every generic G and satisfies T .
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Proof. Let G be generic. To show M [G] is defined we verify the three conditions
(a), (b), (c) in Lemma 2.16 (1). For (a), if p  t = t′ but q 6 t′ = t for every q ≤ p,
then p  ¬t′ = t by forcing recurrence. But then Lit(p) and hence Lit(p) ∪ T is
inconsistent, contradicting (i). Condition (b) is similarly verfied and (c) is the
same as (ii).
To show M [G] |= T is suffices to show that M [G] embeds into a model of
T (since T is universal). For this it suffices to show that T ∪ Diag(M [G]) is
consistent. So let ∆ be a finite subset of Diag(M [G]). Then ∆ ⊆ Th(G) by the
Truth Lemma, that is, every literal λ ∈ ∆ is forced by some pλ ∈ G. Since G is
consistent it contains a common extension p of all the pλ’s. Then ∆ ⊆ Lit(p) by
Extension and T ∪∆ is consistent by (i). 
2.4. Conservative forcing. Let  be an existential or universal forcing. Which
forcings produce generic expansions? We characterize these as follows.
Definition 2.22. The forcing  is conservative if for every condition p and every
atomic L(M)-sentence ϕ (i.e. without a symbol from L∗ \ L)
p  ϕ if and only if M |= ϕ.
Proposition 2.23. If  is conservative, then every generic associates is a generic
expansion. The converse holds true in case  is universal and M [G] is defined
for every generic G.
Proof. For the first statement, let M [G] be a generic associate of M . By
Lemma 2.16 the map a 7→ a/ ∼Th(G) : M → M [G]  L is surjective. If it
is not an isomorphism, then Th(M) and Th(M [G]) disagree on some atomic
L(M)-sentence. As Th(M [G]) = Th(G) by the Truth Lemma, this contradicts
conservativity.
For the second statement, argue indirectly and assume  is not conservative.
Choose an atomic L(M)-sentence ϕ and a condition p witnessing this. Then p  ϕ
if and only if M 6|= ϕ. By Forcing Completeness we find a generic associate M [G]
of M such that M [G] |= ϕ if and only if p  ϕ. Hence ϕ ∈ Th(M)4Th(M [G]),
so Th(M) 6= Th(M [G]  L) and M [G] cannot be an expansion of M . 
2.5. Some examples. Cohen forcing from set theory can be viewed as a special
case of our general set-up:
Example 2.24 (Cohen forcing). Cohen forcing starts with a countable transitive
standard model M of, say, ZF + GCH and wants M [G] to be an extension of M .
In particular L∗ = L = {∈}. Different forcing extensions are obtained by different
choices of (P,≤), typically a set in M , while the forcing Co is kept fix.
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Following e.g. [14] one can define this forcing by universal forcing recurrence
stipulating for atoms:
p Co a ∈ b ⇐⇒
{
q | ∃r∃c ((c, r) ∈ b ∧ q ≤ r ∧ q Co a = c)
}
is dense below p,
p Co a = b ⇐⇒ ∀c ∈ dom(a ∪ b) : p Co (c ∈ a↔ c ∈ b).
It is not hard to show that this uniquely determines a universal pre-forcing. The
technicality of the definition is to ensure that it is a forcing. Genericity is defined
to mean: intersect every dense set that is definable in M . This coincides with
our notion for ∅ = D0 = D1 = . . ..
In set theory one defines M [G] as follows: the membership symbol ∈ is inter-
preted by membership and the constants a ∈ M are interpreted by aG := {bG |
∃p ∈ G : (b, p) ∈ a}. It is easily seen that M [G] is an extension of M for every
generic G.
Under this definition of M [G], one can show the Truth Lemma for atoms, that
is: for every generic G, aG = bG if and only if a ∼Th(G) b and aG ∈ bG if and only
if Th(G) contains the atom a ∈ b. It follows that M [G] in our sense is defined
for every generic G. Second it follows that M [G] in our sense is isomorphic to
M [G] in the sense of set theory. Indeed, {(a/∼Th(G), aG) | a ∈ M} is such an
isomorphism. y
Feferman was the first explicitly using forcing outside set-theory, namely to
adress questions in computability theory. But already Cantor’s back and forth
method can be seen as a forcing argument. Both are examples of conservative
forcing:
Example 2.25 (Cantor’s Theorem). We give this simple example in some detail,
because it reappears in similar form in paragraph 4.
Let M = (A,A′) be a countable two-sorted structure where the two sorts A
and A′ carry dense linear orders without endpoints  and ′ respectively (i.e.
L = {,′}). Set L∗ := L ∪ {R} for a new binary relation symbol R.
Define the forcing frame (P,≤, D0, D1, . . .) as follows: P is the set of all finite
partial isomorphisms between A and A′; take p ≤ q to mean p ⊇ q; finally
the sets D0, D1, . . . enumerate the sets {p | a ∈ dom(p)}, {p | a′ ∈ im(p)} for
a ∈ A, a′ ∈ A′. Each of these sets is dense.
To define a conservative universal pre-forcing Ca it suffices to define p Ca ϕ
for ϕ an atom of the form Rab. Take this to mean (a, b) ∈ p.
Then Ca is a forcing: that Ca satisfies Extension for atoms is obvious. Be-
cause Ca is conservative we only have to show that it satifies Stability for atoms
of the form Raa′ for a ∈ A, a′ ∈ A′. Argue indirectly: if p 6Ca Raa′, then
(a, a′) /∈ p. Choose b′ 6= a′ such that q := p ∪ {(a, b′)} is a condition (im(p) is
finite). Then q ≤ p and no extension of q contains (a, a′), so no extension of q
forces Raa′. Hence [Raa′] is not dense below p.
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It is easy to see that M [G] is defined for every generic G (e.g. by Lem-
ma 2.16 (1)). By Proposition 2.23 every generic associate M [G] is a generic
expansion of M , that is, a 7→ a/∼Th(G): M ∼= M [G]  L. By definition M [G]
interprets R by {
(a/∼Th(G), b/∼Th(G)) | ∃p ∈ G : p Ca Rab
}
=
{
(a/∼Th(G), b/∼Th(G)) | (a, b) ∈
⋃
G
}
Thus a 7→ a/∼Th(G): (M,
⋃
G) ∼= M [G]. From this and the fact that G intersects
all the sets D0, D1, . . ., it easily follows that
⋃
G is an isomorphism from (A,)
onto (A′,′). y
Example 2.26 (Feferman forcing). In [12] Feferman considers M = N interpret-
ing the language L that has relation symbols for the graphs of successor, addition
and multiplication. L∗ expands L by at most countably many unary predicate
symbols. A condition p is a finite consistent set of literals in the new predicates
L∗ \ L and constants from N. A condition p extends another q if p ⊇ q. For the
sets D0, D1, . . . choose, say, always ∅. Feferman defines a conservative existential
pre-forcing Fe by letting p force an atom involving a new predicate if and only if
the atom belongs to p. It is not hard to see that Fe is a forcing and that M [G]
is defined for every generic G. Applications of Feferman forcing in computability
theory are surveyed in [28]. y
Variations and generalizations of Feferman forcing have been studied in com-
plexity theory:
Example 2.27 (Generic oracles). In [13] Fenner et al. generalize Feferman forc-
ing for the case where L∗ = L ∪ {R} for one new unary predicate R. View a
Feferman condition p as the set of functions in {0, 1}N that map n ∈ N to 0 or
1 whenever Rn ∈ p or ¬Rn ∈ p respectively. Now, instead of using these basic
clopen sets as conditions, [13] use perfect sets in {0, 1}N. Forcing frames consid-
ered in [13] are certain subframes of this forcing frame (cf. [13, Definition 3.3]).
Straightforwardly, Fenner et al. let a perfect set p force an atom Rn if and only if
every function in p maps n to 1. This determines a conservative existential pre-
forcing, that is actually a forcing on the frames considered. For various frames,
Fenner et al. study complexity classes relativized by R in generic expansions. y
Finally Robinson developed forcing in model theory:
Example 2.28 (Finite Robinson forcing). We degrade M to a set of constants,
i.e. we let L = ∅. Further let L∗ be a countable language and T be a consistent
L∗-theory; T∀ is the set of universal consequences of T .
Define the following forcing frame (P,≤, D0, D1, . . .). A condition p is a finite
set of L∗(M)-literals such that T∀ ∪ p is consistent. Define p ≤ q to mean p ⊇ q.
Finally, let D0, D1, . . . enumerate the sets
⋃
a∈M [t = a] for closed L
∗(M)-terms t.
It is easy to see that these sets are dense in P .
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To define an existential pre-forcing Ro, it suffices to define p Ro ϕ for atomic
ϕ. Take this to mean T∀ ∪ p ` ϕ.
Then Ro is a forcing: Extension for atoms is obvious. To verify Stability
for atoms, argue indirectly and assume p 6Ro ϕ where ϕ is an atom. Then
q := p ∪ {¬ϕ} is a condition. Clearly no extension of q forces ϕ, so [ϕ] is not
dense below p.
By Theorem 2.21, M [G] is defined for every generic G and satisfies T∀. Note⋃
G is roughly the same as Diag(M [G]). Hence the Truth Lemma essentially2
says, that generic associates are finitely generic for T , so in particular such struc-
tures exist ([16, Theorem 5.11]). Their theory can be seen as a generalized model-
companion for T . We refer to the book [16] for more information.
Keisler [19] gives more model-theoretic and algebraic applications of Robinson
forcing and some variants of it. y
2.6. Weak forcing. This section is not needed in the following. In [38] Shoen-
field develops Cohen forcing in an indirect way: as an intermediate step he intro-
duces an existential forcing  and verifies the Truth Lemma for it. The actual
forcing wanted, namely one satisfying Forcing Completeness, is then obtained as
the weak forcing ∗:
p ∗ ϕ if and only if p  ¬¬ϕ.
Cohen forcing, and more generally, any universal forcing coincides with its weak
version (Lemmas 2.3 (1) and 2.5 (3)).
In other contexts weak forcings play a more important role [19, 40, 28, 2, 16, 13].
Often, starting with a particular existential forcing one verifies certain desired
properties for the corresponding weak forcing. We use the opportunity of having
a more general set-up and include a short discussion of the two notions.
Example 2.29 (Keisler forcing). Keisler studies generally existential pre-forcings
that satisfy Extension for atoms and the conditions in Lemma 2.16 (1), and proves
Forcing Completeness for ∗ [19, Corollary 1.6]. In a similar context, Stern notes
universal recurrence for ∗ [40, Proposition 1-1]. y
Proposition 2.30. Assume  is a universal or existential pre-forcing satisfying
Extension for atoms. Then
(1)  ⊆ ∗.
(2) ∗ satisfies Stability, i.e. (∗)∗ = ∗.
(3) If M [G] is defined for every generic G, then ∗ is a universal forcing.
Proof. Recall Remark 2.7. By Lemma 2.3 (1)
{p | p ∗ ϕ} = {p | [ϕ] is dense below p} = ˚[ϕ].
2The forcing used in [16] is slightly different from Ro as defined here.
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(1) is clear as the sets [ϕ] for ϕ ∈ L∗(M), are open and trivially X ⊆ X˚ for open
X. (2) then follows from
˚˚
X ⊆ X˚.
For (3) we have to show that ∗ satisfies Extension and Stability for atoms and
satisfies universal forcing recurrence. But ∗ satisfies Extension (for all sentences
of the forcing language) as sets of the form X˚ are open. Further ∗ satisfies
Stability by (2). So ∗ is a forcing. To show ∗ satisfies universal recurrence we
first observe:
Claim. ∗ satisfies Forcing Completeness, i.e. p ∗ ϕ if and only if M [G] |= ϕ
for every generic G containing p.
Proof of the claim: (2) implies that ∗ satisfies Lemma 2.5 (4) as seen in the
proof there. The claim then follows as in the proof of Corollary 2.18 (2). 
The claim implies that ∗ satisfies the ∀-clause and the ∧-clause of universal
recurrence. The ¬-clause for ∗ follows immediately from the ¬-clause for . 
Corollary 2.31. Assume  is a universal forcing and  is an existential forcing
such that  and  agree on atoms of the forcing language. If further M [G] is
defined for every generic G, then  = ∗.
Proof. As  is a forcing, we have for atomic ϕ: {p | p  ϕ} = {p | {q | q 
ϕ} is dense below p} = {p | p  ¬¬ϕ} = {p | p ∗ ϕ}. Thus  and ∗ agree on
atoms and hence so do ∗ and . By Proposition 2.30 (3), ∗ satisfies universal
recurrence, so ∗ = . 
Proposition 2.32. Assume  is an existential pre-forcing such that there are
p0, ϕ0 such that p0 6 ϕ0 and p0 6 ¬ϕ0. Then {ϕ | p0  ϕ} is not closed under
logical consequence. If  satisfies Extension for atoms and M [G] is defined for
every generic G, then  does not satisfy Stability.
Proof. By assumption, p0 does not force (ϕ0∨¬ϕ0). This is valid, so {ϕ | p0  ϕ}
is not closed under logical consequence. If  satisfies Extension for atoms and
M [G] is defined for every generic G, then ∗ is a universal forcing by Proposi-
tion 2.30 (3), so by Corollary 2.19 every valid sentence is weakly forced by every
condition. Hence  6= ∗ and  does not satisfy Stability . 
Remark 2.33 (Universal versus existential forcing). Intuitively, Corollary 2.19
says that universal forcing refers to the meaning of a sentence, not to its syntax.
In contrast existential forcing is syntax sensible, if not trivial (Proposition 2.32),
and Forcing Completeness fails. Informally, existential forcing has defects and
these defects may be repaired when moving to the weak forcing (Proposition 2.30).
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2.7. Summary. To sum up, given an L-model M and L∗ ⊇ L, one specifies a
forcing frame (P,≤, D0, D1, . . .), a relation  between conditions and atoms of
the forcing language that satisfies Extension and Stability (for atoms, cf. Defini-
tion 2.4).
Then (universal or existential) forcing recurrence determines a (universal or
existential) forcing . For every generic G the generic associate M [G], if defined,
satisfies the Truth Lemma, i.e. in M [G] is true exactly what is forced by some
condition in G.
Moreover, to get a conservative forcing (Definition 2.22) it suffices to spec-
ify  only for L∗(M) \ L(M)-atoms. In this case, M [G] is isomorphic to an
L∗-expansion of M .
3. Principal theorems
In set theory one usually considers the case where M [G] is an extension of a
model M of ZF (Example 2.24). Independence results are based on the “Principal
Theorem” [38] stating that every generic extension M [G] models ZF.
In weak theories of arithmetic one is often interested in constructing generic
expansions of a countable nonstandard model M of true arithmetic (cf. sec-
tion 1.3). To get relativized independence results one needs the generic expansions
to model some weak arithmetic. This boils down to the question of when generic
expansions satisfy certain least number principles.
In this paragraph we fix
– a countable forcing frame (P,≤, D0, D1, . . .)
– a conservative universal forcing ,
– an ordered countable L-structure M satisfying the least number principle
(defined below).
– a countable language L∗ ⊃ L.
A model is ordered if it interprets the symbol < by some linear order on its
universe. Given an ordered model N and b0 ∈ N , the quantifiers ∀x < b0 and
∃x < b0 are called b0-bounded.
Remark 3.1. Due to conservativity, forcing recurrence works for bounded quan-
tifiers as it does for unbounded quantifiers:
p  ∀x < b0χ(x) iff ∀a <M b0 : p  χ(a)
p  ∃x < b0χ(x) iff p  ¬∀x < b0¬χ(x)
Note, p  ∃x < b0χ(x) if and only if
⋃
a<M b0
[χ(a)] is dense below p.
Definition 3.2. Let N be an ordered model, b0 ∈ N and Φ be a set of formulas
in the language of N with parameters from N .
(a) N satisfies the least number principle for Φ if every nonempty subset of
its universe that is definable by a formula in Φ has a <N -least element.
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(b) N satisfies the least number principle for Φ up to b0 if it satisfies the least
number principle for {(ϕ(x) ∧ x < b0) | ϕ(x) ∈ Φ}.
We omit reference to Φ, if it is the set of all formulas in the language of N with
parameters from N .
3.1. Partial definability. Recall Examples 2.6, 2.20: a condition p is compati-
ble with ϕ, written p‖ϕ, if p does not force ¬ϕ, or equivalently, if some extension
of p forces ϕ.
Definition 3.3. Let b0 ∈M and ϕ = ϕ(x¯) be an L∗(M)-formula.
(a)  is definable for ϕ if for every p ∈ P the set {a¯ | p‖ϕ(a¯)} is definable in
M .
(b)  is densely definable for ϕ up to b0 if for every p ∈ P there is q ≤ p such
that {c¯ <M b0 | q‖ϕ(c¯)} is definable in M .
We say  is (densely) definable (up to b0) for a set Φ of L∗(M)-formulas if  is
(densely) definable (up to b0) for every ϕ ∈ Φ.
Here, for c¯ = c1 · · · ck by c¯ <M b0 we mean ci <M b0 for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Lemma 3.4. Let b0 ∈M and Φ be a set of L∗(M)-formulas that is closed under
negations. Then
(1)  is definable for Φ if and only if for every ϕ(x) ∈ Φ and p ∈ P the set
{c¯ | p  ϕ(c¯)} is definable in M .
(2)  is densely definable for Φ up to b0 if and only if for every ϕ(x) ∈ Φ and
p ∈ P there is q ≤ p such that {c¯ <M b0 | q  ϕ(c¯)} is definable in M .
Proof. For the forward directions note p  ϕ if and only if p  ¬¬ϕ (by Stability)
if and only if p 6 ‖¬ϕ.
For the backward directions note p‖ϕ if and only if p 6 ¬ϕ. 
Recall that, by conservativity, every generic associate is a generic expansion
(Proposition 2.23).
Theorem 3.5 (Principal). Let b0 ∈ M and Φ be a set of L∗(M)-formulas. If 
is densely definable for Φ up to b0, then every generic expansion of M satisfies
the least number principle for Φ up to b0.
In particular, if  is definable for Φ, then every generic expansion of M satisfies
the least number principle for Φ.
Proof. The second statement follows from the first noting that definability implies
dense definability up to any b0 ∈ M . To prove the first, let M [G] be a generic
expansion of M and ϕ(x) ∈ Φ be such that M [G] |= ∃x < b0ϕ(x). We look for a
least element in the set defined by ϕ(x) in M [G]. It suffices to find a <M b0 such
that M [G] |= ϕ(a) and M [G] 6|= ϕ(b) for every b <M a.
Define
Dϕ :=
⋃
a<M b0
⋂
b<Ma
[(ϕ(a) ∧ ¬ϕ(b))].
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Claim. Dϕ is dense below every condition forcing ∃x < b0ϕ(x).
Proof of the claim. Given p forcing ∃x < b0ϕ(x) we are looking for some q ≤ p
in Dϕ. By universal recurrence
⋃
a∈M [a < b0 ∧ ϕ(a)] is dense below p. By
conservativity each set [a < b0 ∧ ϕ(a)] equals [ϕ(a)] or ∅ depending on whether
a <M b0 or not. Hence
⋃
a<M b0
[ϕ(a)] is dense below p, so for some b <M b0 there
is an extension qb ≤ p forcing ϕ(b).
By dense definability applied to ϕ ∈ Φ and qb ∈ P we find some q˜ ≤ qb such
that
C := {c <M b0 | q˜ 6 ¬ϕ(c)}
is definable in M . By Extension q˜  ϕ(b), so q˜ 6 ¬ϕ(b) by Consistency. Hence
b ∈ C, so C 6= ∅. Because M satisfies the least number principle, C has a least
element a ≤M b <M b0.
As a ∈ C we have q˜ 6 ¬ϕ(a), so by forcing recurrence we find qa ≤ q˜ forcing
ϕ(a). Then qa ≤ q˜ ≤ qb ≤ p.
To show qa ∈ Dϕ, it suffices to show qa  ¬ϕ(b′) for every b′ <M a. But any
b′ <M a ≤M b <M b0 is not in C by minimality of a, so q˜  ¬ϕ(b′) and hence
also qa  ¬ϕ(b′) by Extension. 
Choose p0 ∈ G forcing ∃x < b0ϕ(x) by the Truth Lemma. First note Dϕ ∈
B() as it is defined by the following formula (with parameters) of the Stern
formalism:
∃x(x < b0 ∧ ∀y(y < x→ (ξ ` (ϕ(x) ∧ ¬ϕ(y))))).
The claim and Lemma 2.11 imply that there is a condition p ∈ G∩Dϕ. Hence
there is a <M b0 such that for every b <
M a we have p  (ϕ(a) ∧ ¬ϕ(b)). By the
Truth Lemma M [G] |= ϕ(a) and M [G] |= ¬ϕ(b) for every b <M a. Thus a is a
least element as we are looking for. 
Here is a dual formulation of the Principal Theorem:
Corollary 3.6. Let b0 ∈ M and Φ be a set of L∗(M)-formulas. If for every
ϕ(x¯) ∈ Φ and p ∈ P there is q ≤ p such that
{c¯ <M b0 | q  ϕ(c¯)}
is definable in M , then every generic expansion of M satisfies transfinite induc-
tion for Φ up to b0, that is, for every ϕ(x) ∈ Φ the sentence
∀y < b0(∀z < yϕ(z)→ ϕ(y))→ ∀x < b0ϕ(x).
Proof. The assumption implies that  is densely definable for ¬Φ up to b0 (see
the proof of Lemma 3.4). Now observe that the least number principle for ¬Φ
up to b0 is equivalent to transfinite induction for Φ up to b0. 
Lemma 3.7. The following hold:
(1) Let Ψ be the set of L∗(M)-formulas ϕ such that  is definable for ϕ. Then
Ψ is closed under disjunctions and existential quantification.
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(2) Let b0 ∈M and Ψ be the set of L∗(M)-formulas ϕ such that  is densely
definable for ϕ up to b0. Then Ψ is closed under disjunctions and b0-
bounded existential quantification.
Proof. (1) and closure under disjunction in (2) follow easily from the recurrence
in Example 2.6. We show closure under b0-bounded existential quantification in
(2).
Let ϕ(yx¯) ∈ Ψ and p ∈ P . We are looking for q ≤ p such that {a¯ <M b0 |
q‖∃y < b0ϕ(ya¯)} is definable in M . Because ϕ ∈ Ψ we find q ≤ p such that
{aa¯ <M b0 | q‖ϕ(aa¯)} is definable in M . Then also
{a¯ <M b0 | ∃a <M b0 : q‖ϕ(aa¯)}
is definable in M . By conservativity a <M b0 is equivalent with s  a < b0 for
any condition s. Hence the above set equals
{a¯ <M b0 | ∃a ∈M : q‖(a < b0 ∧ ϕ(aa¯))},
and this is the set we want (see the recurrence in Example 2.6). 
3.2. Definable antichains. We sketch a method to establish dense definability.
We are going to apply it in the next paragraph. The method is intended for the
typical situation where P is an (in general undefinable) subset of M and there
are L(M)-formulas ϕ(x, y), ψ(x, y) such that for all p, q ∈ P
(p ≤ q ⇐⇒M |= ϕ(p, q)) and (p‖q ⇐⇒M |= ψ(p, q)).
In this case, the following two lemmas reduce dense definability of forcing to the
definability of predense antichains refining given definable antichains.
We recall some standard forcing terminology: an antichain is a set of pairwise
incompatible conditions. An antichain A is maximal in X ⊆ P if A ⊆ X and
every p ∈ X is compatible with some element of A. A set X ⊆ P is predense
(below p) if every condition (extending p) is compatible with some condition in
X. E.g. an antichain is predense if and only if it is maximal in P .
We write
X ↓ q := {p ∈ X | p ≤ q} and X ↓ Y := ⋃q∈Y X ↓ q.
The method is based on the simple observation that in order to define the
forcing for some ϕ it suffices to define a maximal antichain in [ϕ]:
Lemma 3.8. If p ≤ q and X is a maximal antichain in [ϕ] ↓ q, then p‖ϕ if and
only if p is compatible with some condition in X.
Proof. If p‖ϕ, then there is r ∈ [ϕ] extending p. Then r ∈ [ϕ] ↓ q since r ≤ p ≤ q.
By maximality of X, r is compatible with some condition in X, and hence, as
r ≤ p, so is p. The converse is immediate by Extension. 
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To find maximal antichains we intend to proceed by induction on ϕ. How to
get, say, a maximal antichain in [¬ϕ] from a maximal antichain X in [ϕ]? The
next lemma shows that this can be done via a predense antichain refining X in
the following sense:
Definition 3.9. For X, Y ⊆ P we say X refines Y if every condition in X that
is compatible with some condition in Y already extends some condition in Y .
Lemma 3.10. Let ϕ, ψ be L∗(M)-sentences, χ(x) an L∗(M)-formula, b0 ∈ M
and p ∈ P .
(1) If X is a maximal antichain in [ϕ] ↓ p, and A ⊆ P ↓ p is an antichain
that is predense below p and refines X, then A \ (A ↓ X) is a maximal
antichain in [¬ϕ] ↓ p.
(2) If X and Y are maximal antichains in [¬ϕ] ↓ p and [¬ψ] ↓ p respectively,
and A ⊆ P ↓ p is an antichain that is predense below p and refines X∪Y ,
then A \ (A ↓ (X ∪ Y )) is a maximal antichain in [ϕ ∧ ψ] ↓ p.
(3) If for every a <M b0, the set Xa is a maximal antichain in [¬χ(a)] ↓ p, and
A ⊆ P ↓ p is an antichain that is predense below p and refines ⋃a<M b0 Xa,
then A \ (A ↓ ⋃a<M b0 Xa) is a maximal antichain in [∀x < b0χ(x)] ↓ p.
Proof. We only show (3). Obviously A′ := A \ (A ↓ ⋃a<M b0 Xa) is an antichain
in P ↓ p. To see A′ ⊆ [∀x < b0χ(x)], let q /∈ [∀x < b0χ(x)] be given. We
claim q /∈ A′. If q /∈ A, there is nothing to show, so we assume q ∈ A and
claim q ∈ A ↓ ⋃a<M b0 Xa. Since q 6 ∀x < b0χ(x) there is a0 <M b0 such that
q 6 χ(a0) (Remark 3.1). By Lemma 2.5 (4) some extension r ≤ q forces ¬χ(a0).
By maximality of Xa0 , the condition r, and hence also q, is compatible with some
condition in Xa0 ⊆
⋃
a<M b0
Xa. Since q ∈ A and A refines
⋃
a<M b0
Xa, we get
q ∈ A ↓ ⋃a<M b0 Xa.
To see that A′ is maximal, let q ≤ p force ∀x < b0χ(x). Then q is compat-
ible with some r ∈ A since A is predense below p. We claim r ∈ A′, i.e. r /∈
A ↓ ⋃a<M b0 Xa. Otherwise r forces ¬χ(a0) for some a0 <M b0 by Extension, and
thus also ¬∀x < b0χ(x) (Corollary 2.19). Hence r cannot be compatible with q
by Extension and Consistency, a contradiction. 
Corollary 3.11. Let Φ be a set of L∗(M)-sentences and assume P has a maxi-
mum 1P . Assume further that A is a predense antichain such that A ⊆ [ϕ]∪ [¬ϕ]
for every ϕ ∈ Φ. If ψ, χ are Boolean combinations of sentences from Φ, then
(1) A ∩ [ψ] is a maximal antichain in [ψ];
(2) A ∩ [¬ψ] = A \ (A ∩ [ψ]) is a maximal antichain in [¬ψ];
(3) A ∩ [ψ ∧ χ] = (A ∩ [ψ]) ∩ (A ∩ [χ]) is a maximal antichain in [ψ ∧ χ].
Proof. First show by a straightforward induction that A ⊆ [ψ] ∪ [¬ψ] for every
Boolean combination ψ of sentences from Φ. This implies (1): to see maximality,
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observe that any p ∈ [ψ] must be compatible with some condition in A by preden-
sity, and since such a condition cannot be in [¬ψ] by Extension and Consistency,
it must be in [ψ].
Knowing (1) for ψ and χ, we get (2) and (3) applying Lemma 3.10 for p := 1P :
note that, in general, if A is an antichain and X ⊆ A, then A refines X, and
A ↓ X = X. 
3.3. Full definability. The forcing frame P is definable in M if there is a first-
order interpretation of (P,≤) in M .
Examples 3.12. In set theory, Cohen forcing (Example 2.24) uses definable
forcing frames. Easton forcing extends Cohen forcing in that it allows the forcing
frame to be a proper class in M , i.e. instead of being a set in M it is only assumed
to be definable in M . In case the class frame is in a certain sense approximable
by set frames, one can define a forcing that satisfies the forcing lemmas and the
Principal Theorem (cf. Section 1.5).
In arithmetic, Feferman forcing (Example 2.26) uses definable forcing frames.
This is due to the fact that it starts with the standard model. Simpson [39] gives
an example of a definable forcing frame starting with a nonstandard model of
arithmetic. y
An easy induction shows:
Lemma 3.13. Assume the forcing frame is definable in M and  is definable
for L∗(M)-atoms. Then  is definable for all L∗(M)-formulas.
Then the Principal Theorem implies:
Corollary 3.14. Assume the forcing frame is definable in M and  is definable
for L∗(M)-atoms. Then every generic expansion of M satisfies the least number
principle.
Example 3.15 (Knight’s trick). We can use brute force to make a forcing defin-
able by working not with M but with the two-sorted structure (P,M) instead. In
[20] Knight does something similar. The trick is to pad M with some other sorts
such that the forcing frame becomes definable for atoms. Knight uses a conser-
vative existential forcing (on the padded structure)3. Lemma 3.13 (modified for
existential forcing, [20, Lemma 2.2]) then gives full definability.
To sample one of Knight’s applications, her padding becomes superfluous when
M is an ω-model of ZFC and the forcing becomes definable in M . Knight shows
that any elementary end extension of M by another ω-model has a generic ex-
pansion interpreting a universal choice function that preserves the elementary
embedding. y
3To be correct, Knight uses a conservative existential pre-forcing that satisfies Extension but
not necessarily Stability for atoms.
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3.4. Forcing and propositional proofs. We give an intuitive summary of the
development sofar as a method to establish lower bounds on the size of proposi-
tional proofs.
Recall Example 1.1. Let ϕ be a relational first-order sentence that is true in
all finite models and let ϕ<x result from ϕ by replacing every quantifier Qy by
Qy < x. Then every 〈ϕ<x〉m,m ≥ 1, is a tautology. We would like to establish a
lower bound on the length of proofs of these tautologies in a given propositional
proof system. Assume proofs in our system are sequences of ‘lines’ with the last
line being the formula proved.
Let M be elementary equivalent to some ‘standard’ L-model (N, <, . . .) and
contain nonstandard elements. Let L∗ extend L by te language of ϕ. Design a
forcing such that ϕ<x is falsified by some nonstandard n ∈ M in some generic
expansion M [G] of M . Define an L∗-formula ‘line y in proof z is false’ such that
any (code of a) proof pi of 〈ϕ<x〉n has a ‘false’ last line. Show in M [G] that the
system is sound: if line y in proof z is false, then so is some line y′ < y.
The art is to construct the forcing frame such that the forcing is densely defin-
able up to b0 for all sentences ‘line i in proof pi is false’ where b0 ∈M is as large
as possible and pi is any (code of a) size <M b0 proof of 〈ϕ<x〉n. Typically, the
logical complexity of the formula ‘line i in proof pi is false’ will reflect the logical
complexity of the propositional formulas the system operates with as well as the
bound b0.
For every L-term s(x) such that sM(n) <M b0, one can then conclude that the
function sN : N → N cannot upper bound the sizes of proofs of the tautologies
〈ϕ<x〉m,m ≥ 1.
4. Forcing against bounded arithmetic
We define Paris-Wilkie forcing, Riis forcing and Ajtai forcing, prove a defin-
ability result for each and give the corresponding independence results.
In this paragraph we fix
– a countable language L containing {+, · , 0, 1, <}.
– a countable L-structure M that is elementarily equivalent to an
L-expansion of (N,+, · , 0, 1, <).
– L∗ := L ∪ {R} for a new binary relation symbol R /∈ L.
We fix some notation. For n ∈M we write
[n] := {a ∈M | a <M n}.
A relation R over M is bounded (in M) if there is b ∈ M such that any
component of any tuple in R is <M b. As N codes every bounded (in N) relation
by an element, M codes every definable bounded (in M) relation by an element.
If m ∈ N is such a code we let
‖m‖
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denote the cardinality of the coded relation. This is not to be confused with
|m|
denoting log(m+ 1) (rounded down). Using the definitions of these functions in
(N,+, · , 0, 1, <), we get corresponding functions ‖ · ‖M and | · |M in M and we
shall omit the superscripts.
For arbitrary n,m ∈M
n <M mo(1)
means that n` <M m for every ` ∈ N.
4.1. Paris-Wilkie forcing. Paris and Wilkie [29] gave “the first forcing argu-
ment in the context of weak arithmetic” [21, p.278] establishing independence of
the pigeonhole principle ∀xPHP(R, x) from the least number principle for existen-
tial formulas. Recall PHP(R, x) expresses “R is not a bijection from {y | y ≤ x}
onto {y | y < x}”.
Theorem 4.1 (Paris, Wilkie 1985). Let n ∈ M be such that [n] is infinite.
Then M has an L∗-expansion satisfying both ¬PHP(R, n) and the least number
principle for existential L∗(M)-formulas.
Let n ∈M with infinite [n]. We define a forcing frame
(P,≤, D0, D1, . . .).
Note that every finite bijection from a subset of [n] ∪ {n} onto a subset of [n] is
coded by an element in M . We let P be the set of all these codes. Note that P
is not definable in M .
As partial order we use p ≤ q if and only if p ⊇ q. Here, and below, we blur
the distinction between p and the bijection coded.
The family D0, D1, . . . enumerates the (countably many) sets
{p | b ∈ dom(p)}, {p | c ∈ im(p)} for b ≤M n, c <M n.
To determine a universal pre-forcing PW it suffices to define p PW ϕ for
atoms ϕ. Further we want a conservative forcing, so it suffices to define p PW ϕ
for ϕ an L∗(M)-atom that is not an L(M)-atom. Such an atom has the form Rst
for closed L(M)-terms s, t. We set
p PW Rst ⇐⇒ (sM , tM) ∈ p.
It is easy to check (cf. Example 2.25):
Lemma 4.2. The following hold:
(1) PW is a forcing.
(2) M [G] is defined and a generic expansion of M for every generic G.
(3) M [G] violates PHP(R, n) for every generic G.
Lemma 4.3. PW is definable for quantifier free L∗(M)-formulas.
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We give the proof exemplifying the method of definable antichains from Sec-
tion 3.2. However, a direct proof would be equally easy. Note that we are in the
“typical situation” that we have L(M)-formulas ϕ(x, y), ψ(x, y) such that for all
p, q ∈ P
(p ≤ q ⇐⇒M |= ϕ(p, q)) and (p‖q ⇐⇒M |= ψ(p, q)).
E.g. ψ(x, y) is a formula expressing that both x and y code partial bijections
that agree on arguments on which they are both defined.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. Let ϕ = ϕ(x¯) be a quantifier free L∗(M)-formula. For c¯
from M let T (c¯) be the set of those a ∈M that are denoted by some closed term
in ϕ(c¯). Further let Ac¯ be the set of all inclusively minimal partial bijections p
such that both dom(p) contains T (c¯) ∩ [n+ 1] and im(p) contains T (c¯) ∩ [n]. As
T (c¯) is finite, Ac¯ ⊆ P . It is routine to verify that Ac¯ is a predense antichain in P
and equal to α(y, c¯)(M) for a suitable L(M)-formula α(y, x¯).
For an atom ψ = ψ(x¯) occuring in ϕ(x¯) we have Ac¯ ⊆ [ψ(c¯)] ∪ [¬ψ(c¯)]. Fur-
ther there is an L(M)-formula ξψ(y, x¯) such that ξψ(y, c¯)(M) defines Ac¯ ∩ [ψ(c¯)].
We find such a formula ξχ(z, x¯) for every Boolean combination χ of such atoms
following the recursion in Corollary 3.11 (2), (3). In particular, we find an L(M)-
formula ξϕ(y, x¯) such that ξϕ(y, c¯) defines a maximal antichain in [ϕ(c¯)].
Lemma 3.8 (for q the empty partial bijection) implies that PW is definable
for ϕ(x¯). 
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Choose a generic G (Lemma 2.10). Up to isomorphism,
then M [G] expands M and violates PHP(R, n) (Lemma 4.2). By Lemmas 4.3
and 3.7, PW is definable for existential L∗(M)-formulas. By the Principal The-
orem 3.5, M [G] satisfies the least number principle for these formulas. 
4.2. Riis forcing. One may wonder what in the above proof is special about
the pigeonhole principle. Riis pointed out that essentially what is needed is that
the principle fails in the infinite [35, 35]. He uses existential forcing and allows
for certain infinite conditions. The point is that the new forcing frame allows to
define the forcing for more formulas.
For an L(M)-formula ϕ0(x, y) let
(R : yˆϕ0(x, y) ∼ [x])
be a formula expressing “R is a bijection from {y | ϕ0(x, y)} onto [x]”. This is
an L∗(M)-formula with free variable x.
Definition 4.4. An L(M)-formula ϕ0(xy) defines an n
Ω(1) family in M if there
are ` ∈ N and an L(M)-formula σ(yz, x) such that for every n ∈M , σ(yz, n)(M)
is a surjection from (ϕ0(n, y)(M))
` onto [n] provided ϕ0(n, y)(M) is nonempty.
If every ϕ(ny)(M), n ∈ M, is bounded and, say, coded by cn ∈ M , then
defining a nΩ(1)-family means that there is an ` ∈ N such that n ≤M ‖cn‖` for
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every n ∈ M . For example, b0 <M no(1) if and only if (x = n ∧ y < b0) does not
define a nΩ(1)-family in M .
Examples 4.5. If we choose for ϕ0(x, y) the formula y ≤ x, then (R : yˆϕ0(n, y) ∼
[n]) becomes ¬PHP(R, n). If we choose y < x · x, then our formula negates the
weak pigeonhole principle with n2 pigeons and n holes. Choosing y = y we negate
the cardinal principle (cf. [18]).
If we assume that the L-structure (N,+, · , 0, 1, <, . . .) additionally interprets
an infinite unary predicate U and a binary relation E ⊆ U × U , then (R :
yˆϕ0(n, y) ∼ [n]) with ϕ0(x, y) := Uy expresses that R copies the infinite directed
graph (U,E) to the new universe [n] (“Finitization” [35]).
These examples define nΩ(1) families in M . y
Let Σb01 (R) denote the closure of the set of quantifier-free L
∗(M)-formulas by
existential and b0-bounded quantification (i.e. quantifiers of the form ∃x < b0
and ∀x < b0, cf. page 17).
Theorem 4.6 (Riis 1993). Let ϕ0(xy) define an n
Ω(1) family in M and let b0, n ∈
M be such that b0 <
M no(1). Then M has an L∗-expansion satisfying both (R :
yˆϕ0(ny) ∼ [n]) and the least number principle for Σb01 (R).
Remark 4.7. The reader familiar with bounded arithmetic will notice the fol-
lowing. Use Buss’ language for L and choose n and b0 such that both b0 <
M no(1)
and |n| <M bo(1)0 . By the second inequality M |= |t(n)| < b0 for every (parameter
free) L-term t(x) and hence Σb01 (R) includes all Σ
b
1(R) formulas with parame-
ters bounded by some L-term in n. Thus the restriction of the expansion to the
corresponding cut is a model of T 12 (R) and (R : yˆϕ0(ny) ∼ [n]).
Let ϕ0(xy) and b0, n ∈M accord the assumption of Theorem 4.6. We prove the
theorem only for the case where [b0] is infinite. In case [b0] is finite, b0-bounded
quantifiers can be eliminated and one can argue as in the last section.
Definition 4.8. A relation R over M is `-small if it is empty or there are ` ∈ N
and an L(M)-definable surjection from [b0]
` onto R. R is small if it is `-small for
some ` ∈ N.
Then [n] is not small and neither is
A0 := ϕ0(ny)(M).
Here, and only here, we use the assumption that ϕ0(xy) defines a n
Ω(1)-family
in M .
We define the forcing. An `-small bijection from a subset of A0 onto a subset
of [n] is L(M)-definable and bounded in M , and hence coded by an element of
M . Let P` ⊆M be the set of all these codes. The set of conditions is
P :=
⋃
`∈N
P`.
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Again we set p ≤ q if p ⊇ q, and let the family D0, D1, . . . enumerates the sets
{p | a ∈ dom(p)}, {p | c ∈ im(p)} for a ∈ A0, c ∈ [n].
The forcing relation is defined as in the previous section: p Ri Rst if and only
if (sM , tM) ∈ p. This uniquely determines a conservative universal pre-forcing,
and in fact a forcing (cf. Example 2.25).
Lemma 4.9. Let ` ∈ N.
(1) P` ⊆ P`+1 ⊆ P ⊆M .
(2) P` is L(M)-definable.
(3) If p, q ∈ P`, then p ∪ q ∈ P`+1 and p ∩ q ∈ P`,
(4) The sets D0, D1, . . . are dense.
Proof. We only show (4). Observe that both the domain and range of a condition
p ∈ P are small. As neither A0 nor [n] is small, both (A0\dom(p)) and ([n]\im(p))
are infinite. Then (4) follows easily. 
Lemma 4.10. Ri is definable for Σb01 (R).
This implies the theorem:
Proof of Theorem 4.6. Clearly, M [G] is defined for every generic G. By Propo-
sition 2.23 all generic associates of M are generic expansions and it should be
clear that they all satisfy (R : yˆϕ0(ny) ∼ [n]). Thus Theorem 4.6 follows from
Lemma 4.10 and the Principal Theorem. 
To prove Lemma 4.10 we rely on the following lemma. It can be shown following
the proof of Lemma 4.3 in the previous section.
Lemma 4.11. For every quantifier free L∗(M)-formula ϕ(x¯) there is an L(M)-
formula 3ϕ(y, x¯) such that for every p ∈ P
3ϕ(p, x¯)(M) = {c¯ | p‖ϕ(c¯)}.
Proof of Lemma 4.10. For variable tuples x¯ = x1 · · ·x`, y¯ = y1 · · · y` let Qx¯y¯ ab-
breviate the quantifier prefix
∀x1 < b0∃y1 ∀x2 < b0∃y2 · · · ∀x` < b0∃y`.
It suffices to show that Ri is definable for every formula of the form Qx¯y¯ϕ where
ϕ is a quantifier free L∗(M)-formula (by Corollary 2.19 since M [G] is defined for
every generic G).
Fix a quantifier free L∗(M)-formula ϕ(z¯). Define the formula
ϕ(y, z¯) := ¬3¬ϕ(y, z¯).
By Lemma 4.11 and Stability, we have for every condition p ∈ P
ϕ(p, z¯)(M) = {c¯ | p Ri ϕ(c¯)}.
For a tuple c¯ from M let Ac¯ be the predense antichain as defined in the proof
of Lemma 4.3. In particular, Ac¯ ⊆ [ϕ(c¯)] ∪ [¬ϕ(c¯)] and Ac¯ ∩ [ϕ(c¯)] is a maximal
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antichain in [ϕ(c¯)]. Further Ac¯ ⊆ P1 since every condition in Ac¯ is finite and we
assumed that [b0] is infinite.
For any two tuples x¯, y¯ of variables of the same length ` we show the following:
for all p ∈ P and all c¯′ there is q ∈ P`+1, q‖p such that
(∗) if p‖Qx¯y¯ ϕ(x¯, y¯, c¯′), then M |= Qx¯y¯ ϕ(p ∪ q, x¯, y¯, c¯′),
where c¯′ ranges over assignments to the free variables z¯′ of Qx¯y¯ ϕ. It is not hard
to see that then
∃u(u ∈ P`+1 ∧ u‖p ∧Qx¯y¯ ϕ(p ∪ u, x¯, y¯, z¯′))
defines {c¯′ | p‖Qx¯y¯ ϕ(x¯, y¯, c¯′)} in M . Here “u ∈ P`+1” is an L(M)-formula
according Lemma 4.9 (2) and “x‖y” is an L(M)-formula expressing compatibility
as in the previous section.
We prove (∗) by induction on `. The base case, ` = 0, is easy: if p‖ϕ(c¯), then
p is compatible with some q ∈ Ac¯ ∩ [ϕ(c¯)] by Lemma 3.8. But Ac¯ ⊆ P1 and
p ∪ q Ri ϕ(c¯).
For the inductive step, let xx¯, yy¯ be length `+1 tuples of variables, let c¯′ range
over assigments to the free variables z¯′ in Qxx¯yy¯ ϕ and write ϕ = ϕ(xx¯, yy¯, z¯′).
Let p ∈ P and c¯′ be such that p‖Qxx¯yy¯ ϕ(xx¯, yy¯, c¯′), i.e. there is p˜ ≤ p forcing
∀x < b0∃y Qx¯y¯ ϕ(xx¯, yy¯, c¯′). Using universal recurrence and Remark 3.1, this is
easily seen to be equivalent to: for every a <M b0 and every q ≤ p˜ there is b ∈M
such that q‖Qx¯y¯ ϕ(ax¯, by¯, c¯′). By induction we get for every a <M b0 and every
q ≤ p˜
M |= ∃u(u ∈ P`+1 ∧ u‖q ∧ ∃y Qx¯y¯ ϕ(q ∪ u, ax¯, yy¯, c¯′)).
Let ψ(z) be the formula
∃u((u = ∅ ∨ ∃v“v is a surjection from [z]× [b0]`+1 onto u”)
∧ u‖p˜ ∧ ∀x < z∃y Qx¯y¯ ϕ(p˜ ∪ u, xx¯, yy¯, c¯′)).
Claim. M |= ψ(b0).
Proof of the claim. It is straightforward to verify M |= ψ(0) and M |= (ψ(a) →
ψ(a+ 1)) for every a <M b0. 
By the claim there is q˜ ∈ P (even in P`+2) compatible with p˜ such that
M |= Qxx¯yy¯ ϕ(p˜ ∪ q˜, xx¯, yy¯, c¯′).
As M satisfies the least number principle it defines Skolem functions: there
are L(M)-definable functions ff¯ = f, f1, f2, f3, . . . such that
M |= ∀xx¯ < b0ϕ
(
p˜ ∪ q˜, xx¯, f(x)f¯(xx¯), c¯′).
Here, f¯(xx¯) is shorthand for f1(xx1)f2(xx1x2)f3(xx1x2x3) · · · .
Recall how the antichains Ac¯ are defined: they consist in all ⊆-minimal condi-
tions whose domain contains T (c¯)∩ [n+ 1] and whose image contains T (c¯)∩ [n],
where T (c¯) is the set of things named by closed terms in ϕ(c¯).
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Write T (z¯) = T (xx¯, yy¯, z¯′) and set
S(c¯′) :=
⋃
aa¯<M b0
T (aa¯, f(a)f¯(aa¯), c¯′).
Let Bc¯′ be defined for S(c¯
′) as Ac¯ is for T (c¯). Then Bc¯′ is an L(M)-definable set
of (` + 2)-small conditions. Furthermore Bc¯′ is a predense antichain that refines
every Ac¯, where c¯ is of the form aa¯f(a)f¯(aa¯)c¯
′ for some aa¯ <M b0.
Claim. If aa¯ <M b0 and c¯ = aa¯f(a)f¯(aa¯)c¯
′, then Bc¯′ ⊆ [ϕ(c¯)] ∪ [¬ϕ(c¯)].
Proof of the claim. Let aa¯ <M b0 and c¯ = aa¯f(a)f¯(aa¯)c¯
′. Every r ∈ Bc¯′ is
compatible with some condition in Ac¯ by predensity. Since Bc¯′ refines Ac¯, r
extends some condition in Ac¯. Since Ac¯ ⊆ [ϕ(c¯)]∪[¬ϕ(c¯)], also r ∈ [ϕ(c¯)]∪[¬ϕ(c¯)]
by Extension. 
By predensity there is r ∈ Bc¯′ such that (p˜ ∪ q˜)‖r. Then r‖p and r ∈ P`+2, so
we are left to check M |= ∀xx¯ < b0ϕ
(
p ∪ r, xx¯, f(x)f¯(xx¯), c¯′). By Extension it
suffices to verify
M |= ∀xx¯ < b0ϕ
(
r, xx¯, f(x)f¯(xx¯), c¯′
)
.
But otherwise there is aa¯ <M b0 such that r 6Ri ϕ(aa¯, f(a)f¯(aa¯), c¯′). By the last
claim, then r Ri ¬ϕ(aa¯, f(a)f¯(aa¯), c¯′). But p˜∪ q˜ Ri ϕ(aa¯, f(a)f¯(aa¯), c¯′) (by the
choice of q˜), so r cannot be compatible with p˜∪ q˜ by Extension and Consistency,
a contradiction. 
4.3. Ajtai forcing. We prove Ajtai’s result [1] including its improvements from
[27, 30]. Compared to Riis’ Theorem 4.6 it embodies an exponential improve-
ment concerning the bound b0, but only concerns b0-bounded formulas. Citing
Zambella, any techniques that can allow to handle the case of Σb01 (R) for such
big b0 would be extremely interesting [46, p.403].
Let ∆b00 (R) denote the closure of the set of quantifier-free L
∗(M)-formulas by
b0-bounded quantification (cf. page 17).
Theorem 4.12 (Ajtai 1988). Let b0, n ∈M be such that |b0| <M no(1). Then M
has an L∗-expansion satisfying both ¬PHP(R, n) and the least number principle
for ∆b00 (R) up to b0.
Remark 4.13. The reader familiar with bounded arithmetic will notice the fol-
lowing. Use Buss’ language for L and choose b0, n ∈M such that both |b0| < no(1)
and |n| < |b0|o(1). By the second inequality b0 bounds tM(n) for every L-term
t(x). Thus the restriction of the expansion to the corresponding cut is a model
of T2(R) that violates PHP(R, n).
Fix some d ∈ N. Following Section 3.4 it is not hard to infer from Theorem 4.12
that proofs of 〈PHP(R, x)〉m,m ∈ N, in depth d Frege systems must have size at
least 2m

for some  > 0 (depending on d).
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For m ∈ N consider the following finite forcing frame (P (m),≤) (without a
family D0, D1, . . .): the conditions are all finite partial bijections from [m+ 1] to
[m] and p ≤ q means p ⊇ q. Again, we blur the distinction of the bijection and
its code in N. The size ‖p‖ of a condition p is its cardinality, i.e. the number of
pigeons mapped. The rank of a set X ⊆ P (m) is the maximal size of a condition
in X (and, say, 0 if X is empty).
Now fix M and n, b0 ∈M according the assumptions of Theorem 4.12. Observe
that there are uniform definitions of P (m) in the standard model (N,+, · , 0, 1, < )
meaning that there is a {+, · , 0, 1, <}-formula ϕ(x, y) such that P (m) =
ϕ(m, y)(N) for every m ∈ N. Applied in M , these definitions give forcing frames
(P (m),≤) with size function ‖ · ‖ also for (nonstandard) m ∈ M . Further note
that M defines the function m 7→ m (rounded up) for any (standard) rational
0 <  < 1.
We now define the forcing frame P . It is going to be an undefinable subframe
of the definable frame P (n). For every standard rational 0 <  < 1 the set
{p ∈ P (n) | ‖p‖ <M n−n} is definable in M . We let P be the union of all these
sets. As usual p ≤ q means p ⊇ q, and the family D0, D1, . . . enumerates the sets
{p ∈ P | b ∈ dom(p)} and {p ∈ P | c ∈ im(p)} for b ≤M n, c <M n. It is easy to
see that these sets are dense (in P ).
We define the forcing as in the previous two sections: we let p ∈ P force an
atom Rst if (sM , tM) ∈ p and denote by Aj the resulting conservative universal
pre-forcing. It is easy to see that Aj is a forcing and that M [G] is defined for
every generic G (cf. Section 4.1).
Lemma 4.14. Aj is densely definable for ∆b00 (R) up to b0.
Proof of Theorem 4.12. It is clear that every generic associate of M violates
PHP(R, n) and by conservativity it is a generic expansion ofM (Proposition 2.23).
Thus Theorem 4.12 follows from the above lemma by the Principal Theorem. 
To prove Lemma 4.14 we follow the method of definable antichains from Sec-
tion 3.2. Note that Lemma 4.14 follows easily from Lemma 3.8 and:
Lemma 4.15. Let p ∈ P . For every ϕ(x¯) ∈ ∆b00 (R) there is r ∈ P, r ≤ p and
a sequence of sets (Xa¯)a¯<M b0 in M such that for every a¯ <
M b0, the set Xa¯ is a
maximal antichain in [ϕ(a¯)] ↓ r of rank at most ‖r‖+ |b0|.
Here, a sequence (Xa¯)a¯<M b0 of subsets of M is in M if the set {(a¯, c) | a¯ <M
b0, c ∈ Xa¯} is coded in M .
We are thus left to prove this lemma. To do so we intend to use Lemma 3.10.
Therefore we need to define predense antichains refining given sets and it is here
where the finite combinatorics enter the argument. The idea is to show that
suitable antichains exist in P (m) for m ∈ N sufficiently large. Then M codes
these antichains for the infinite P (n). As a first problem, predensity does not
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make much sense in finite frames nor in P (n). Therefore we shall calibrate the
notion in the definition below. Second, suitable antichains need not to exist,
but they do exist after restricting attention to conditions that extend a suitably
chosen condition r. This choice is done according to the Switching Lemma 4.18
below, the combinatorial core of the argument. Details follow.
Definition 4.16. Let m, k ∈ N, q ∈ P (m) and X ⊆ P (m). Then X is k-predense
(in P (m)) below q if every condition that extends q and has size at most m− k
is compatible with a condition in X.
For m ∈M , p ∈ P (m) and X ⊆ P (m) write
Xp := {q \ p | q ∈ X, p‖q} and X ∪ p := {q ∪ p | q ∈ X, p‖q}.
Note that P (m)p ∼= P (m − ‖p‖) via a size preserving isomorphism. By saying
that an antichain is k-predense in P (m)p we mean that its image under this
isomorphism is k-predense in P (m − ‖p‖). In the same way k-predensity is
explained in P (n)p.
Lemma 4.17. Let X ⊆ P , p, q ∈ P, q ≤ p and let ϕ be an L∗(M)-sentence. If
X is a maximal antichain in [ϕ] ↓ p and has rank at most ‖p‖+ |b0|, then X ∪ q
is a maximal antichain in [ϕ] ↓ q.
Proof. As X ⊆ P ↓ p, Xp has rank at most |b0|. Then X ∪ q = Xp ∪ q has rank
at most ‖q‖+ |b0|, so X ∪ q ⊆ P . Clearly, X ∪ q is an antichain.
To show containment in [ϕ] ↓ q, let r ∈ X ∪ q and choose s ∈ X, q‖s such that
r = s ∪ q. Since X ⊆ [ϕ], we have s ∪ q ∈ [ϕ] ↓ q by Extension.
To show maximality, let r ∈ [ϕ] ↓ q. By maximality of X, r is compatible with
some s ∈ X. As r ≤ q, q is compatible with s. Then s ∪ q ∈ X ∪ q is compatible
with r. 
Lemma 4.18 (Switching). Let `,m, k,N ∈ N, k ≤ ` be sufficiently large and let
X1, . . . , XN ⊆ P (m) be sets of rank at most k. Assume
(∗) N2/k`100 < m.
Then there is q ∈ P (m) of size at most m − ` such that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ N
there is an antichain Ai ⊆ P (m)q refining Xqi that is k-predense in P (m)q and
has rank at most k.
This lemma can be proved by the probabilistic method or a direct (involved)
counting argument. Details can be found in [21, Lemma 12.3.10] or in the refer-
ences pointed out in Section 1.4.
Applied in M the Switching Lemma provides us with suitable antichains in
restrictions of P (n). The following easy lemma allows to move these antichains
to P .
Lemma 4.19. Let p ∈ P and X, Y ⊆ P (n)p have rank at most |b0|.
(1) If X is an antichain in P (n)p, then X ∪ p is an antichain in P .
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(2) If X is |b0|-predense in P (n)p, then X ∪ p is predense in P below p.
(3) If X refines Y in P (n)p, then X ∪ p refines Y ∪ p in P .
Proof. We only show (2). Note X ∪ p ⊆ P because it has rank at most ‖p‖+ |b0|.
Let q ∈ P, q ≤ p and choose 0 <  < 1 such that ‖q‖ <M n − n. Then
‖q \ p‖ = ‖q‖ − ‖p‖ <M n− n − ‖p‖ <M (n− ‖p‖)− |b0|. Since (q \ p) ∈ P (n)p
and X is |b0|-predense in P (n)p, there is r ∈ X such that q \ p is compatible with
r in P (n)p. Then q ∪ r = q ∪ (r ∪ p) extends both q and r ∪ p ∈ X ∪ p. As q ∪ r
has size <M ‖q‖+ |b0| it is in P , so q and r ∪ p are compatible in P . 
The rest of the argument is straightforward:
Proof of Lemma 4.15. Let p ∈ P . Call a L∗(M)-formula good if the lemma holds
for it. It is easy to verify that atomic formulas are good: for an atom ϕ(x¯) of
the form Rst with L(M)-terms t = t(x¯), s = s(x¯) take r := p and define Xa¯ :=
{r ∪ {(sM(a¯), tM(a¯))}} or Xa¯ := ∅ depending on whether r ∪ {(sM(a¯), tM(a¯))} is
a partial bijection from [n + 1] to [n] or not. Similarly, for an L(M)-atom ϕ(x¯)
set r := p and Xa¯ := {r} or Xa¯ := ∅ depending on whether M |= ϕ(a¯) or not.
We leave it to the reader to verify that the set of good formulas is closed
under conjunctions and negations. As the set of good formulas is closed under
logical equivalence (Corollary 2.19), we are thus left to show it is closed under
b0-bounded universal quantification.
So assume ϕ(xx¯) is good. Then ¬ϕ(xx¯) is good and we can choose r ∈ P ,
r ≤ p and antichains (Xaa¯)aa¯<M b0 that satisfy the claim for ¬ϕ(xx¯). Since every
antichain Xaa¯ is in P ↓ r and has rank at most ‖r‖+ |b0|, we know that Xraa¯ has
rank at most |b0|.
Choose 0 <  < 1 such that ‖r‖ <M n − n. Then n <M n − ‖r‖ =: m.
Observe that as partial orders
P (n)r ∼= P (m),
via an isomorphism that is definable in M and preserves the size ‖ · ‖.
For a¯ <M b0 let
Ya¯ :=
⋃
a<M b0
Xraa¯.
Note Ya¯ has rank at most |b0|, and the sequence (Ya¯)a¯<M b0 is in M .
We intend to apply the Switching Lemma in M to get refining antichains for
the sequence (Ya¯)a¯<M b0 . We check its assumptions:
Calculated in M , the sequence has length N := b`00 for `0 the length of x¯.
Especially N2/|b0| (calculated in M) i s bounded by a standard number in M
(i.e. by a closed {+, 1}-term). Therefore we can choose a rational 0 < ′ < 1
(e.g. ′ := 1/101) such that the inequality (∗) of the Switching Lemma is satisfied
for ` := m
′
and k := |b0| (and m,N as defined above). Further k = |b0| <M
(n)
′
<M m
′
= `.
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Thus the lemma applies: we find r′ ∈ P (n)r of size at most m − m′ such
that, writing s := (r ∪ r′), the following holds: for every a¯ <M b0 there is an
Aa¯ ⊆ (P (n)r)r′ = P (n)s coded in M such that in P (n)s
(i) Aa¯ is an antichain that is |b0|-predense,
(ii) Aa¯ refines Y
r′
a¯ ⊆ P (n)s,
(iii) Aa¯ has rank at most |b0|.
Note that s has size ‖r‖ + ‖r′‖ ≤M n − m + m − m′ <M n − n′ , so s ∈ P .
Further note that with Ya¯ also Y
r′
a¯ has rank at most |b0|. By Lemma 4.19 we get
in P
(iv) (Aa¯ ∪ s) is an antichain that is predense below s,
(v) (Aa¯ ∪ s) refines Y r′a¯ ∪ s =
⋃
a<M b0
(Xaa¯ ∪ s),
(vi) (Aa¯ ∪ s) has rank at most ‖s‖+ |b0|.
By Lemma 4.17 (Xaa¯∪s) is a maximal antichain in [¬ϕ(aa¯)] ↓ s. By (Aa¯∪s) ⊆
P ↓ s, (iv) and (v) the assumptions of Lemma 3.10 (3) are satisfied. Thus we get
a maximal antichain in [∀x < b0ϕ(xa¯)] ↓ s setting
Za¯ := (Aa¯ ∪ s) \
(
(Aa¯ ∪ s) ↓
⋃
a<M b0
(Xa¯ ∪ s)
)
.
Then (Za¯)a¯<M b0 is in M and has rank at most ‖s‖+ |b0| by (vi). 
4.4. Notes. Compared to Riis’ original argument [35] our proof of Theorem 4.6
relies on the stability of universal forcing (and Corollary 2.19) while Riis uses an
existential forcing, and it is simpler in that it sidesteps the analysis of an auxiliary
pre-forcing in [35].
Compared with other proofs of Theorem 4.12, roughly, the predense antichains
in our argument correspond to the complete systems in [27] and in [46], to
branches in shallow decision trees in [45, 25] or to the small covers in [1].
Forcing type arguments for Ajtai’s result have been given in [1, 46] and [21,
Section 12.7] and recently in [25]. In [21, Section 12.7] Kraj´ıcˇek presents the
method of k-evaluations of propositional formulas [27] as a forcing type argument.
Our proof constructs for certain ϕ a predense antichain together with its maximal
part in [ϕ]. These pairs of sets give rise to a modified notion of |b0|-evaluation. As
Zambella’s [46] our argument sidesteps a detour through propositional logic like
in [1, 27, 45, 21]. Further it avoids the restriction to “internal” generics in [46].
Kraj´ıcˇek’s recent proof in [25] (cf. Section 1.7) uses forcing with random vari-
ables, developed in [25] as a general method to construct Boolean valued models
of bounded arithmetics. This recent argument, the argument given here and in
fact all known arguments for Ajtai’s result use the Switching Lemma in one or an-
other form. The main obstacle to generalize Ajtai’s argument to other principles
is the difficulty to find analogues of this lemma. Our interpretation of the role
of this lemma is roughly as follows: it states the existence of refining antichains.
34 A. ATSERIAS AND M. MU¨LLER
The rest of the argument can be taken over by the general machinery, the method
of definable antichains and the Principal Theorem as described in paragraph 3.
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